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PROCLAMATIONS, NATIONAL MONUMENTS, AND THE
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES
ACT OF 1906
ROBERTO IRAOLA*
INTRODUCTION
Almost a century ago, Congress passed the Antiquities Act of
1906 ("Antiquities Act" or "Act") authorizing the President, by
proclamation, to set aside federal lands as national monuments.'
At its inception, the Act's sponsors envisioned the designation of
national monuments in the Southwest of limited size, but the Act
has been applied broadly and become "a significant executive tool
to shape sometimes controversial conservation policies."2 Between
the passage of the Act in 1906 and 2001, fourteen presidents
created 123 national monuments.3 Examples include Craters of the
* Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and
Security at the Department of the Interior. J.D., Catholic University Law School
(1983). The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not
purport to reflect the views of the Department of the Interior.
1 Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 209, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2000)).
2 Robert W. Righter, National Monuments to National Parks: The Use of the
Antiquities Act of 1906, 20 W. HIST. Q. 281, 285 (1989); see also Albert C. Lin,
Clinton's National Monuments: A Democrat's Undemocratic Acts?, 29 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 707, 713 (2002) ("From the outset, and notwithstanding the primary
motivations behind the Act's passage, presidential exercise of the Act's authority
has not been limited to protecting archaeological objects or small geographical
areas."); James R. Rasband, Utah's Grand Staircase: The Right Path to
Wilderness Preservation?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 483,500 (1999) (describing the Act
as "one of the most powerful conservation tools of this century"). See generally
RONALD F. LEE, THE STORY OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906, 47-77 (1970)
(discussing the legislative history of the Act), available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/
aad/PUBS/LEEFIndex.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
' Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA.
L. REV. 473,488 (2003). President Clinton created nineteen national monuments,
more than any of his predecessors since the enactment of the Act. Sanjay
Ranchod, Note, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting Ecosystems with
the Antiquities Act, 25 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 535, 537 (2001).
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Moon in Idaho,4 Chaco Canyon in New Mexico,5 and Grand
Staircase-Escalante in Arizona.6 National monuments designated
under the Act are located in twenty-eight states, the District of
Columbia, and one territory, encompassing approximately seventy
million acres of land.7
Throughout its nearly one hundred year history, the
Antiquities Act has come under criticism on several fronts.' For
example, the Act provides that in designating a national
monument, the President is required to set aside "the smallest
area compatible with the proper care and management of the
objects to be protected."9 Critics have argued that the designation
of large monuments violates this requirement." Some maintain
that the original purpose of the Act was solely to protect objects of
antiquity and that Presidents have used it for broad purposes,
more in line with national parks, or other congressional
designations, than with national monuments. 1 Others contend
' Proclamation No. 1694, 43 Stat. 1947 (May 2, 1924).
5 Proclamation No. 740, 35 Stat. 2119 (March 11, 1907).
6 Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 18, 1996). Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument, the largest monument ever created in the
continental United States, encompasses 1.7 million acres. Ranchod, supra note
3, at 536.
7 Squillace, supra note 3, at 488. Many of the country's most prized national
parks, such as Glacier Bay, Bryce Canyon, Zion, and the Grand Canyon started
out as national monuments. Id. at 488-89.8 See Scott Y. Nishimoto, President Clinton's Designation of the Grand Canyon-
Parashnat National Monument: Using Statutory Interpretation Models to
Determine the Proper Application of the Antiquities Act, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
51, 54 (2002) ("Since its inception, the Act has protected valuable sites, but has
also generated its share of controversy and criticism.").
9 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
10 CAROL HARDY VINCENT & PAMELA BALDWIN, NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND THE
ANTIQUITIES ACT, CONG. RES. SERv. REP. No. RL30528, at 4 (Apr. 17, 2001)
("Critics assert that large monuments violate the Antiquities Act, in that the
President's authority regarding size was intended to be narrow and limited.");
Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 68 ("[Clritics argue that there is no standard for
what 'smallest area compatible' means, which gives the President an excessive
amount of discretion.").
11 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that some critics "claim
that Presidents have used the Act for impermissibly broad purposes, such as
160
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that Congress intended the Antiquities Act to allow the President
to designate national monuments when there are impending
threats to resources, but that occasionally it has been used instead
for political reasons. 12 Still others argue that the Act represents an
unconstitutionally broad delegation of Congress's power under the
Property Clause. 3
Notably, there have been only a handful of cases that address
challenges to or otherwise touch upon the scope of national
general conservation, recreation, scenic protection, or protection of living
organisms, and that such purposes are more appropriate for a national park or
other designation established by Congress."). See also Justin James Quigley,
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument: Preservation or Politics?, 19 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 55, 88-89 (1999) ("While the Antiquities Act does
not define object, it is commonly understood to mean 'anything that is visible or
tangible.' Therefore, the intent of the Antiquities Act is only to protect specific
ascertained objects, not unknown resources.") (footnote omitted); Richard M.
Johannsen, Comment, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the Antiquities Act,
56 WASH. L. REV. 439, 450 (1981) ("Congress... intended to limit the creation
of national monuments to small reservations surrounding specific 'objects.'")
(footnote omitted).
12 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 5 ("Presidential creation of
monuments in the absence of impending threats to resources troubles those who
believe that the law is intended to protect objects that are endangered or
threatened. They charge that Presidents have established monuments to support
environmental causes, limit development, and score political gains, among other
reasons."); Ranchod, supra note 3, at 583 (noting how critics of some of President
Clinton's national monument designations "denounce[d] the political nature of
their timing.").
13 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States."). See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note
10, at 8 ("Some have asserted that the Antiquities Act is an unconstitutionally
broad delegation of Congress' power, because the President's authority to create
monuments is essentially limitless since all federal land has some historic or
scientific value."). See also Janice Fried, The Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument: A Case Study in Western Land Management, 17 VA.
ENVTL. L .J. 477, 515 (1998) (noting that "[a]n alternative legal challenge to the
creation of Grand Staircase-Escalante National Mo[nu]ment [was] that the
Antiquities Act was an unlawful delegation of congressional power to the
executive branch.").
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monument designations under the Antiquities Act. 14 This Article,
which is divided into two parts, analyzes those cases and discusses
the limited scope ofjudicial review over presidential proclamations
under the Act. The Article first provides a general overview of the
Act, the nature and scope of presidential proclamations, the types
of national monuments that have been created, and the limits on
land use that typically follow a monument designation. It then
discusses the few cases that have confronted challenges to
proclamations establishing national monuments and examines
how the deferential judicial review accorded by the courts in those
cases is consistent with separation of powers principles.
I. OVERVIEW
In 1906, Congress passed the Antiquities Act, both to respond
to concerns over damage to archaeological sites and provide a swift
means to safeguard federal resources and lands. 5 In pertinent
14 See United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1976); Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450,
455-56 (1920); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 61 (2003); Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138
(D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 63 (2003); Utah Ass'n of Counties v.
Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001); Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Bush, 316 F.
Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Utah 2004); Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. Alaska 1980); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D.
Alaska 1978); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
15 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 4 ("The Antiquities Act was a
response to concerns over theft from and destruction of archaeological sites and
was designed to provide an expeditious means to protect federal lands and
resources."); Squillace, supra note 3, at 477 ("Most commentators who have
considered the Act and its legislative history have concluded that it was designed
to protect only very small tracts of land around archaeological sites.") (footnote
omitted). See also Matthew W. Harrison, Legislative Delegation and Presidential
Authority: The Antiquities Act and the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument - A Call for a New Judicial Examination, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
409, 413-14 (1998) ("The main purpose behind the Act was to protect specific
items of antiquity, such as ruins, pottery, and picture graphs. The scientific
community aimed to protect ancient American Indian ruins that were being
lost, destroyed, or exploited as the United States was being explored and
developed.") (footnotes omitted).
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part, the Act authorizes the President, "in his discretion, to declare
by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest 16 that
are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States to be national monuments." 7
When exercising discretion to establish national monuments, the
Act further provides that the President "may reserve as a part
thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be
confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and
management of the objects to be protected."8
The plain language of the Act confers upon the President the
authority to designate national monuments without public
participation, congressional review, or any other procedural
prerequisite. 9 While there has been nojudicial decision addressing
16 This last phrase "other objects of historic or scientific interest," as reflected in
the discussion below, "has proved dispositive in the cases that have supported
an expansive interpretation of the Antiquities Act." Squillace, supra note 3, at
481 (footnote omitted); Johannsen, supra note 11, at 451 (making a similar
observation); cf. Rasband, supra note 2, at 501 (noting that "as soon as the Act
was enacted, presidents began to rely on its language allowing withdrawal of
'other objects of historic or scientific interest' to accomplish much larger
withdrawals.") (footnote omitted).
17 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000). Under the Act there are restrictions on the designation
of national monuments in Wyoming. See 16 U.S.C. § 43 la ("No further extension
or establishment of national monuments in Wyoming may be undertaken except
by express authorization of Congress."). In Alaska, congressional approval is
required for withdrawals of more than 5,000 acres. 16 U.S.C. § 3213 (2000). See
also Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 55 ("[Tlhe Alaska National Lands Conservation
Act of 1980 ('ANILCA')... requires congressional approval for designations of
national monuments in Alaska exceeding 5,000 acres (16 U.S.C. 3123).")
(footnote omitted); Lin, supra note 2, at 717 ("ANILCA also made potential
future withdrawals in Alaska under the Antiquities Act of more than 5,000 acres
subject to congressional approval.") (footnote omitted). But see Squillace, supra
note 3, at 506 ("ANILCA, however, prohibits new withdrawals in excess of 5,000
acres. It does not preclude a mere national monument designation that does not
include a withdrawal of lands.") (footnotes omitted).
'8 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
19 See Fried, supra note 13, at 512 ("The Act allows the President to create
national monuments without congressional review, public participation, or any
other procedural requirements.") (footnote omitted); Ranchod, supra note 3, at
2004] 163
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the question of revocation, a 1938 Attorney General's opinion has
led most legal commentators to conclude that, once established,2 °
a President cannot rescind or revoke the reservation associated
with a national monument.21 Whether the President may modify
540 ("[Tlhe Antiquities Act includes no requirements for notice or public
participation, and includes no processes for facilitating congressional oversight.")
(footnotes omitted); David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The
Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, 300
(1982) ("The Antiquities Act gave the President authority to withdraw lands with
no limits on duration, unhindered by any procedural requirements, with no
provision for congressional review, and with no fixed acreage limitation.")
(footnotes omitted).
20 In response to the question of whether President Roosevelt could abolish the
Castle-Pinckney National Monument, which had been previously created by
President Coolidge, Attorney General Homer Cummings concluded that
President Roosevelt lacked such authority. Proposed Abolishment of Castle
Pickney Nat'l Monument, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185-89 (1938). He reasoned:
The grant of power to execute a trust, even discretionally, by no
means implies the further power to undo it when it has been
completed. A duty properly performed by the Executive under
statutory authority has the validity and sanctity which belong
to the statute itself, and, unless it be within the terms of the
power conferred by that statute, the Executive can no more
destroy his own authorized work, without some other legislative
sanction, than any other person can.
Id. at 187.
21 Id.; see Squillace, supra note 3, at 554 ("[I]t is both logical and appropriate to
construe the Antiquities Act to allow a President to protect resources, but to
deny a President the authority to undo those protections.") (footnote omitted);
James R. Rasband, The Future of the Antiquities Act, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 619, 626 (2001) [hereinafter Future of the Antiquities Act] ("The
Antiquities Act . . . gives only express withdrawal authority and gives no
authority to revoke. It thus seems logical that a court would be much more
reluctant to find implied authority to revoke a proclamation issued pursuant to
a specific congressional directive."); Quigley, supra note 11, at 79 (noting that
after a President establishes a national monument, he is "'without power to
revoke or rescind the reservation.'") (quoting 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 188 (1938));
PAMELA BALDWIN, AUTHORITY OF A PRESIDENT TO MODIFY OR ELIMINATE A
NATIONAL MONUMENT, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. No. RS20647, at 3 (Aug. 3, 2000)
(concluding that "there is no language in the 1906 Act that expressly authorizes
revocation; there is no instance of past practice in that regard, and there is an
attorney general's opinion concluding that the President lacks that authority.").
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the size of a monument remains more of an open question in
academic circles.22
Lastly, it bears noting that in 1976, Congress passed the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"),23 legislation
that requires congressional approval for withdrawals of land in
excess of 5,000 acres by the Secretary of the Interior.24 FLPMA
also provides hearing and notice provisions for withdrawals by the
Secretary of less than 5,000 acres. Significantly, when it enacted
See also Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 93 ("No President has ever revoked a
national monument created under the Antiquities Act and no President has ever
tried. This is probably due to the fact that, even assuming the President had the
authority to undo a predecessor's designation, the political repercussions would
be extremely high.") (footnote omitted).
22 Compare Squillace, supra note 3, at 566 (arguing that, under controlling
authority, even assuming the President has the power to modify an existing
national monument, that power "is limited to boundary adjustments that are
necessary to reflect 'the smallest area compatible with the proper care and
management of the objects to be protected.'") (footnote omitted) and Lin, supra
note 2, at 711-12 ("Once the President establishes a monument, he is without
power to revoke or rescind the reservation, although it remains uncertain
whether the President may reduce a monument in size.") (footnote omitted), and
Ranchod, supra note 3, at 554 ("The extent to which a national monument that
was created by presidential proclamation can be changed by a subsequent
president is unclear, since only expansions and small reductions of existing
documents have ever been attempted.") (footnote omitted) with Nishimoto, supra
note 8, at 55 (noting that the Act "authorizes the President to reduce the size of
existing national monuments to conform with the 'smallest area compatible with
the proper care and management of the objects to be protected' clause.") (footnote
omitted) and BALDWIN, supra note 21, at 3 ("That a President can modify a
previously Presidentially-created monument seems clear."). See generally Future
of the Antiquities Act, supra note 21, at 627, (noting that the opinion of the
Attorney General "and a 1947 Interior Decision opined that a president has the
power to reduce the size of a monument because of the requirement in the
Antiquities Act that monuments be confined to 'the smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.'"(footnotes
omitted)).
23 Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704, 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976) (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000)).
24 See 43 U.S.C. § 17 14(c)(2 000).
25 Id. at §§ 1714(b)(1) & (h). See generally Johannsen, supra note 11, at 442-
49 (discussing congressional policies underlying FLPMA and its land withdrawal
provisions).
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FLPMA, Congress did not amend or repeal its delegation to the
President to withdraw lands under the Antiquities Act.26
A. Presidential Proclamations
A proclamation is the means under the Act by which a
President is authorized to establish national monuments and, like
its sibling the "executive order,"2 7 is a species of executive directive
that has enjoyed a long history.28 In 1936, Congress passed the
Federal Register Act, legislation requiring executive orders and
presidential proclamations "of general applicability and legal
effect" to be published in the Federal Register unless the President
concludes otherwise on account of national security or other
specified reasons. 29 The routing and form of proclamations and
executive orders is itself established by an executive order, which
identifies the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as
26 See Ranchod, supra note 3, at 548 (noting that the "Antiquities Act was
mysteriously left intact, and is the most important statute authorizing executive
withdrawals to survive the FLPMA's sweeping repeal of executive authority.");
Fried, supra note 13, at 516 ("Although Congress repealed all other executive
withdrawal authority when enacting FLPMA, the Antiquities Act was
intentionally and specifically excluded.") (footnotes omitted). See also John D.
Leshy, Shaping the Modern West: The Role of the Executive Branch, 72 U. COLO.
L. REV. 287, 298 (2001) (arguing that FLPMA represents a congressional
endorsement of executive withdrawal authority).
27 See Ranchod, supra note 3, at 541 ("In general, executive orders direct the
president's subordinates within the federal government to take some action on
particular matters, while presidential proclamations address the public in
general, and are used primarily when required by statute, in the field of foreign
affairs, and for ceremonial purposes.") (footnote omitted).
28 See Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other
Presidential Directives, 5 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 267, 273 (2001) ("From the
founding of the nation, American Presidents have developed and used various
types of presidential or executive 'directives.' Although executive orders and
presidential proclamations are the best known directives, many other documents
have a similar function and effect.") (footnotes omitted).29 See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2000). In addition to their publication in the Federal
Register, executive orders and proclamations have been annually published since
1938 in the Code of Federal Regulations, and since 1941 in the U.S. Code
Congressional and Administrative News. See Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 62.
166
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the person responsible for coordinating and guiding the process. °
B. National Monuments
Unlike national parks, which are preserved because of their
national character and outstanding scenery, national monuments
"are reserved because of their historic, prehistoric, or scientific
interest."31 They can be established by an act of Congress or, as
noted previously, by a presidential proclamation under the
Antiquities Act.32 Typically, while management of national
'0 See Exec. Order No. 11,030, 3 C.F.R. 610 (1959-1963), reprinted in 44 U.S.C.
§ 1505 (2000). One commentator has described the mechanics of the process as
follows:
First, the executive branch must coordinate with the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") regarding the proposed
executive order [or proclamation]. Second, the General Counsel
for OMB must circulate the proposed order [or proclamation] to
interested departments, agencies, and parts of the White House
staff that it concerns. If there is a policy disagreement regarding
the proposed executive order [or proclamation], OMB is to
determine and design a dispute resolution process to address the
issues of disagreement. Third, the Director of OMB is to send the
proposed executive order [or proclamation] to the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Department of Justice. The Office of Legal
Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney General, issues an opinion on
whether the proposed executive order [or proclamation] is
"acceptable for form and legality." Fourth, the Office of Legal
Counsel sends the proposed order [or proclamation] back to the
White House for the President's signature. Finally, the "White
House Clerk then transmits the signed Executive Order to the
Office of the Federal Register for numbering and publication."
Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 63; see Gaziano, supra note 28, at 293 (discussing
process).
31 National Park Service & U.S. Department of the Interior, Glimpses of Our
National Monuments, (U.S. Printing Office 1930) at http://www.cr.nps.gov/
history/online books/glimpses2/glimpsesO.htm at "General Introduction" (last
modified Oct. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Glimpses of Our National Monuments].
32 See Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 64-65 (noting that "national monuments can
be designated by Congress and by presidential executive orders under the
authority of the Antiquities Act of 1906"). Congress has established 29 national
monuments. Id. at 66.
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monuments has been given to the National Park Service, such
authority has also been delegated to agencies such as the Forest
Service and Bureau of Land Management.33
There are four general types of national monuments: historic,
prehistoric, biologic, and geologic.34 Prehistoric and historic
national monuments contain the ruins of the homes of those who
lived in the United States before the arrival of European settlers,
as well as the ruins of structures built by those early settlers
including, for example, the Spanish missions of the Southwest.
3 5
Geologic monuments hold fossil remains of prehistoric reptilian
life, as well as limestone caves, petrified plants and trees, and
other volcanic phenomena.3 6 Biologic national monuments provide
habitat for plant or animal life.37
The designation of federal land as a national monument will
generally affect its use.3" The President has the discretion to
33 See Lin, supra note 2, at 712 ("Although management of national monuments
has been vested for the most part in the National Park Service . .. such
management responsibilities have also been delegated to other agencies,
including the Bureau of Land Management . . .and the Forest Service.")
(footnote omitted); VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 7 (noting how Bureau
of Land Management ("BLM") was chosen to manage several monuments
designated by President Clinton "because the federal lands already were under
BLM management, and were intended to be both protected and managed for
multiple uses.") There appears to be some question, however, as to whether an
agency other than the National Park Service may manage a national monument.
See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 8; Squillace, supra note 3, at 520-33;
Fried, supra note 13, at 507-12.
3' Glimpses of Our National Monuments, supra note 31 (General Introduction).
3 5 Id.
36 Id. Bryce Canyon National Monument in Utah is an example of a geologic
national monument. Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 65.
37 Glimpses of Our National Monuments, supra note 31 (Introduction). Joshua
Tree National Monument in California is an example of a biologic national
monument. Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 66. See generally ROSS W. GORTE,
FEDERAL LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A PRIMER, CONG. RES. SERV. REP.
No. RS20002, at 2 (Dec. 22, 1998) ("National monuments are established to
preserve specific natural resources of historic, cultural, or scientific interest,
including outstanding geologic formations (e.g., unusual caves or dunes) or may
include unique ecological communities and wildlife habitat.").
3 See Squillace, supra note 3, at 514-15 ("In general... virtually all monument
proclamations contain very similar language warning 'all unauthorized persons
168
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identify land uses in a national monument "but those uses must
satisfy the Act's requirement of 'proper care and management of
the objects to be protected."'39 For example, lands that acquire
national monument status may have new constraints placed upon
them with respect to existing or future mineral and energy
leases.4 ° Other possible effects include restrictions on the
harvesting of timber, as well as grazing and hunting.4'
Having completed a cursory review of the Act, the mechanics
of presidential proclamations, and the types of national
monuments that have been established, as well as how such
designations affect land use, the discussion now turns to
separation of powers principles. That discussion is followed by an
analysis and synthesis of the cases that have addressed legal
challenges to national monument designations under the Act.
not to appropriate, injure, destroy, or remove any feature' of the monument, and
'not to locate or settle upon any of the lands thereof."') (footnote omitted);
Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 53 ("Designating an area as a national monument
affords the area greater protection than existing federal laws and regulations by
restricting or prohibiting industrial and recreational use of federal lands.")
(footnote omitted).
39 Lin, supra note 2, at 712 (footnote omitted).
40 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 5 ("A common concern is the effect
of monument designation on mineral and energy leases and mining claims on
federal lands. Monument designation potentially could result in new constraints
on development of existing leases and permits, as well as bar new leases, claims,
and permits."); Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 53 ("Most national monuments
include a ban or restriction on vehicle use, mining, oil drilling, grazing, hunting,
and logging.") (footnote omitted); cf Squillace, supra note 3, at 516 ("At a
minimum, all national monument lands are off limits to new mineral leasing
under the express terms of the Mineral Leasing Act.") (footnote omitted);
Ranchod, supra note 3, at 572 ("New mining, oil and gas drilling, logging, and
other intensive commercial extractive uses are generally prohibited in landscape
monuments.") (footnote omitted).
41 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 5-6 ("Another concern is the
potential or actual restriction on commercial timber cutting as a result of
designation. ... Other concerns have included the possible effects of monument
designation on grazing, hunting, and off-road vehicle use."); GORTE, supra note
37, at 2 ("Permitted and prohibited uses in national monuments are largely the
same as in the national parks: many recreation uses are allowed, although
hunting may be restricted or forbidden. Wood cu[tt]ing and most commercial
activities are usually curtailed (but mineral extraction may be allowed).").
1692004]
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C. Separation of Powers
The Constitution reflects the Framers' intent to "divide the
delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three
defined categories" with the expectation "that each branch of
government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. 42
Consistent with this intent, Article I vests "[aill legislative Powers"
in Congress.43 This grant of power is tempered by the executive
branch's authority under Article II to implement legislation."6
Whether an action by either the legislative or executive branch
exceeds the authority delegated to that branch under the
Constitution involves "a delicate exercise of constitutional
interpretation" by the Supreme Court,"5 which, under Article III,
is the final authority of such matters.46 Lastly, "[wihile the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into
a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness
but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."
4 7
Congress is entrusted with the "Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States."4' This power is "without
limitations," 9 and the Antiquities Act is illustrative of "a proper
42 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996)
(recognizing that the "lawmaking function belongs to Congress and may not be
conveyed to another branch or entity"); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,
136 (1810) ("It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general
rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals
in society would seem to be the duty of other departments.").
44 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1 & 3; cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)
("[T]he Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws.").
4' Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
46 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1-2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803) (holding that the judiciary is the branch that has the authority
"to [slay what the law is").
41 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
48 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
49United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,29 (1940). This includes, of course,
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delegation of congressional authority to the President under the
Property Clause.""° Where the authorizing statute or another
statute does not place any limits on the discretion of the President
to act, separation of powers concerns altogether bar a review of
that decision by the courts for abuse of discretion.51 In the case of
the Antiquities Act, while it grants the President broad discretion,
and separation of powers concerns are present, the statute also
contains some restrictions. Judicial review "is available to ensure
that the Proclamations are consistent with constitutional
principles and that the President has not exceeded his statutory
authority."52
the power to create national monuments. See GORTE, supra note 37, at 2
("National monuments may be established by an Act of Congress, although most
have been established by presidential proclamation under the authority of the
1906 Antiquities Act.").
50 Tulare County v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18, 26 (D.D.C., 2001). See Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944) (recognizing that delegation is
constitutionally permissible if Congress provides standards to guide the
authorized action such that one reviewing the action could recognize "whether
the will of Congress has been obeyed."). See also Ranchod, supra note 3, at 547
("Congress may authorize withdrawals by the executive branch for a specific
purpose, such as designation of national monuments under the Antiquities
Act."); Fried, supra note 13, at 515-16 ("Because the 1906 Act has been in effect
for so long, and since courts have upheld other statutes that have granted broad
delegations to the President, it is unlikely that a court would find the Antiquities
Act . . . to be an unlawful delegation of congressional power.") (footnotes
omitted).
51 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994) (recognizing that although a
claim that the President has violated a statutory mandate may be judicially
reviewable outside the framework of the Administrative Procedures Act, "such
review is not available when the statute in question commits the decision to the
discretion of the President"); United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S.
371, 379 (1940) (holding that manner by which President addressed problem of
foreign exchange value under the Tariff Act of 1930 was not "open to scrutiny"
by the Court because the statute granted the President authority to exercise his
judgment in arriving at such value); cf. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d
1322, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Dalton's holding merely stands for the proposition
that when a statute entrusts a discrete specific decision to the President and
contains no limitations on the President's exercise of that authority, judicial
review of an abuse of discretion claim is not available.").
52 Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1136; see Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1141
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II. THE CASE LAW
The cases involving challenges to the designation of national
monuments under the Act emanate from the Supreme Court,
circuit appellate courts, and district courts. The following section
analyzes cases from each of these courts.
A. Supreme Court Precedent
In Cameron v. United States,53 the first Supreme Court case to
address the Act, the government sought to enjoin Ralph A.
Cameron and others from occupying and using a lode mining claim
in the Grand Canyon National Monument. 54 The opinion primarily
discussed legal challenges to the Secretary of the Interior's
decision rendering the mining claim invalid. The Court first
considered, however, whether President Theodore Roosevelt even
had authority to create the Grand Canyon National Monument in
the first place.55 The Court swiftly found that the Act empowered
the President to designate "objects of historic or scientific interest"
and the Grand Canyon easily met that standard. 6
(reviewing complaint "to determine whether it contain [ed] factual allegations to
support an ultra vires claim that would demonstrate the district court erred in
declining to engage in a factual inquiry to ensure that the President complied
with the statutory requirements"); Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Bush, 316 F. Supp.
2d at 1186 ("Although judicial review is not available to assess a particular
exercise of presidential discretion, a Court may ensure that a president was in
fact exercising the authority conferred by the act at issue.").
53 252 U.S. 450 (1919).
54 Id. at 454-55.
55 Id. at 455.
56 Id. The Court reasoned:
The Grand Canyon, as stated in [the President's] proclamation,
"is an object of unusual scientific interest." It is the greatest
eroded canyon in the United States, if not the world, is over a
mile in depth, has attracted wide attention among explorers and
scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic study, is
regarded as one of the great natural wonders, and annually
draws to its borders thousands of visitors.
Id. at 455-56. See Squillace, supra note 3, at 492 (noting that "the clear
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The next Supreme Court case which considered the application
of the Act was Cappaert v. United States.57 The petitioners in
Cappaert, who owned a ranch near Death Valley National
Monument, began pumping groundwater from an underground
basin that also served as the source of water for Devil's Hole, a
prehistoric limestone cavern which was part of the Monument.5"
The government sought and obtained an injunction to limit
petitioners' pumping activities from certain wells for domestic
purposes, and also from specific locations near Devil's Hole, on the
theory that the lower water level was threatening the survival of
a unique species of fish in the pool.59 As in Cameron, the opinion in
Cappaert primarily discussed issues extraneous to the application
of the Act (in this case, the scope of the implied reservation of
water rights doctrine)."° Petitioners similarly argued that the
President had no authority to reserve the pool found in Devil's
Hole because the Act was limited to the protection of
archaeological sites.61 The Court summarily rejected this
contention, finding that the pool and the rare inhabitants of Devil's
Hole squarely fell within the ambit of "objects of historic or
scientific interest."
6 2
Most recently, the Supreme Court touched upon the
application of the Antiquities Act in United States v. California.6"
The question confronting the Court there was whether the United
States or California had dominion over the waters and submerged
lands within the Channel Islands National Monument, which
comprised Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands and one-mile belts
implication of the Court's decision was that the size of the monument was not
disqualifying if the 'protected object' was otherwise of 'scientific interest'")
(footnote omitted); Ranchod, supra note 3, at 549 ("The conclusion that a
behemoth geologic feature could qualify as a monument set the stage for
unrestrained application of the Act by subsequent presidents.").
5' 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
58 Id. at 131-33.59 Id. at 135-36.
60 Id. at 138.
61 Id. at 141-42.
62 Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142.
6 436 U.S. 32 (1978).
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surrounding the islands.64 The Court ruled that President Truman
had the authority under the Antiquities Act to reserve the waters
and submerged lands as part of the national monument, but the
Submerged Lands Act subsequently had conveyed those waters
and lands to California.6" The opinion in California is instructive
with respect to the Antiquities Act because the Court recognized
that, although the Act refers to "lands," it authorizes the
reservation of waters located on or over federal lands.66
B. Circuit Court Precedent
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
addressed the question of standing under the Act in the case of
interveners who alleged an interest in supporting a national
monument designation. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit confronted broad challenges to
the President's authority under the Antiquities Act on two
occasions. At issue in these three cases, discussed below, were
proclamations by President Bill Clinton establishing monuments
in the West.
The only appellate opinion to date addressing the question of
standing under the Act by an intervener seeking to join suit is
Utah Association of Counties v. Clinton.67 This appeal arose from
a consolidated case involving two actions brought in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah seeking injunctive
' Id. at 33-34. This monument was originally established by President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt in 1938 and enlarged by President Truman in 1949. Id.65 Id. at 36-37.
66 Id. at 36 n.9. Towards the end of its opinion, the Court pointed out that the
Submerged Lands Act "provides for the retention by the United States of its
navigational servitude and its 'rights in and powers of regulation and control of
said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation, national defense, and international affairs."' California, 436 U.S. at
41 n. 18. One commentator argues that this observation supports the view that
the submerged lands which were conveyed are still part of the monument since
the Court made no explicit finding to the contrary and "some 'control' over the
lands is all that is required to allow designation of a national monument."
Squillace, supra note 3, at 518-19 n.287.
67 255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001).
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and declaratory relief in connection with the designation of Grand
Staircase Escalante National Monument in 1996.68 Petitioners,
tourism-related businesses and environmental organizations,
sought mandatory or permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(a) & (b) and the district court denied their motion.69
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court's ruling, finding that, under the
governing standard,7 ° petitioners were entitled to intervene as a
matter of right.7 The court of appeals held that petitioners had
demonstrated an interest sufficiently related to the pending action
"by virtue of their support of [the monument's] creation, their goal
of vindicating their conservationist vision through its preservation,
their use of the monument in pursuit of that vision, and their
economic stake in its continued existence."72 Insofar as the ability
of the government to represent adequately the interests of the
organizations, the court pointed out that the case law made clear
that the "government's representation of the public interest
generally cannot be assumed to be identical to the individual
parochial interest of a particular member of the public merely
because both entities occupy the same posture in the litigation."
73
With regard to the environmental organizations and tourism-
related businesses at issue in the case, the court found that the
government's failure to take a position on the motion to intervene
68 Id. at 1248-49. See Rasband supra note 2, at 514-16 & nn. 148-54 (discussing
arguments raised in the consolidated cases); VINCENT& BALDWIN, supra note 10,
at 8.
69 Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1249.
70 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) states, in pertinent part:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action ... when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action
and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
Id.
71 Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1256.
72 Id. at 1252.
73 Id. at 1255-56.
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buttressed the view that the putative interveners' interests would
not be adequately represented.74
The next two reported appellate opinions concerning the Act
emanate from the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. First, in Mountain States Legal Foundation
v. Bush,75 petitioners challenged President Clinton's designation
of six national monuments. 76 The challenge was partly on the
grounds that the President had acted ultra vires because, under
the Property Clause, the Constitution granted Congress the sole
power to make rules and regulations respecting federal property
and to dispose of said property. 77 The district court dismissed the
complaint, finding that the Property Clause was not at issue and
that "[u]lpon facial review.., the President... had not acted ultra
vires."78
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that no ultra
vires claim predicated on a Property Clause violation could be
established because "the President exercised his delegated powers
under the Antiquities Act, and that statute include[d] intelligible
principles to guide the President's action."79 The court also
74 Id. at 1256 ("The government has taken no position on the motion to intervene
in this case. Its silence on any intent to defend the interveners' special interests
is deafening.") (internal quotation omitted). See also Squillace, supra note 3, at
536-38 (discussing standing).
7 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 24 S.Ct. 61 (2003).
76 The monuments challenged were: the Grand Canyon-Parashant National
Monument, the Ironwood Forest National Monument, and the Sonoran Desert
National Monument in Arizona; the Canyons of the Ancients National
Monument in Colorado; the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument in Oregon;
and the Hanford Reach National Monument in Washington. Id. at 1133-34.77 Id. at 1134.
78 Id.
'
9 Id. at 1137. The court observed that "[n]othing in the record.., indicated any
infirmity in the challenged Proclamations. Each Proclamation identified
particular objects or sites of historic or scientific interest and recited grounds for
the designation that comported with the Act's policies and requirements." Id. It
declined to address whether the President had abused his discretion under the
Act because petitioners had not adequately pled such a claim in their complaint.
Id. The Attorney General stated in a brief opposing the petition for a writ of
certiorari in Mountain States that:
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rejected, as a matter of law, the argument that the Act
contemplated the designation of only "rare and discrete man-made
objects, such as prehistoric ruins and ancient artifacts.""0 In
support of its ruling, the court of appeals relied on Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the Antiquities Act as allowing presidential
designation of the Grand Canyon and comparable sites as national
monuments.81
Similarly, in Tulare County v. Bush, 2 petitioners challenged
the designation of Giant Sequoia National Monument, arguing in
part that the proclamation violated the Act because it failed to
identify objects of historic or scientific interest with reasonable
specificity, designated improper objects, and was not limited in
83size. Petitioners also maintained that absent judicial review, the
delegation of legislative power to the President under the Act was
unconstitutional. 4 The district court dismissed the complaint for
Even if petitioners had timely pleaded a claim that the President
abused his discretion in applying the Antiquities Act standards
to the designations at issue here, petitioners would not be
entitled to judicial review of that contention. Even as a general
matter, waivers of sovereign immunity must be express ... and
there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for such a claim. But
in addition, '[o]ut of respect for the separation of powers and the
unique constitutional position of the President,' this Court
'would require an express statement by Congress before
assuming it intended the President's performance of his
statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.' . . .
Neither the Antiquities Act nor any other federal statute
authorizes abuse-of-discretion review of the President's
designation of national monuments under the Act. Petitioners'
abuse-of-discretion claim therefore would not be justiciable even
if it had been pleaded in a timely and adequate manner.
Brief of Federal Respondent, at 8-9, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg
briefs/2003/Oresponses/2002-1590.resp.pdf.8oMountain States, 306 F.3d at 1137.
s Id. The court also rejected the contention that the proclamations defied the
purpose of other federal statutes designed to protect environmental and
archaeological values, finding that federal laws may provide "overlapping
sources of protection." Id. at 1138.
12 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
13 Id. at 1140-41.
84 Id. at 1141.
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failure to state a claim, 5 and the court of appeals affirmed. s6
Preliminarily, the court of appeals found that the
proclamation sufficiently identified objects of scientific interest and
historic sites as required by the statute. 7 As to the contention that
the inclusion of items such as ecosystems and scenic vistas
contravened the types of designations permitted under the Act, the
court held that, under Cappaert, the President's authority was "not
limited to protecting only archaeological sites."8 The court also
found that the Act "[did] not impose upon the President an
obligation to make any particular investigation" regarding the
scope and size of the designated memorial and that petitioners had
not identified, with sufficient particularity, lands that had been
improperly designated. 9 Lastly, with respect tojudicial review, the
court followed the rationale of Mountain States and held that no
violation of the Property Clause could be established because the
President had exercised authority under the Antiquities Act which
contained "intelligible principles" to circumscribe his discretion.9 °
C. District Court Precedent
There have been four district court decisions addressing
challenges to the designation of national monuments. They
involved President Clinton's designation of the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument, President Franklin Delano
85 Tulare County, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 21.
86 Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1140.
871 Id. at 1141. The court observed:
The Proclamation lyrically describes "magnificent groves of
towering giant sequoias," "bold granitic domes, spires, and
plunging gorges," "an enormous number of habitats," "limestone
caverns and... unique paleontological resources documenting
tens of thousands of years of ecosystem change," as well as
"many archaeological sites recording Native American
occupation ... and historic remnants of early Euroamerican
settlement."
Id.
88 Id. at 1142.
89 
Id.
90Id. at 1143.
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Roosevelt's designation of Jackson Hole National Monument, and
President Jimmy Carter's designation of national monuments in
Alaska. These decisions are discussed in detail below.
In Utah Association of Counties v. Bush,91 a consolidated
action, plaintiffs alleged that President Clinton's designation of the
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument was improper on
several grounds.92 First, plaintiffs maintained that the Antiquities
Act was unconstitutional because it violated the delegation
doctrine.93 In a related argument, plaintiffs contended that
President Clinton had acted ultra vires because, under the
Property Clause, the authority to manage federal lands rested
exclusively with Congress.94 Plaintiffs also argued that the
President had violated the standards set forth in the Act and that
his action contravened Executive Order 10,355, which delegated
authority to withdraw or reserve lands to the Secretary of the
Interior,95 the Wilderness Act of 1964, which grants Congress the
power to designate wilderness areas,96 and a host of other laws.9"
91 316 F. Supp. 2d. 1172 (D. Utah 2004).
92 See id. The court issued its opinion following the resolution of the appeal in
Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1246; new defendants were
substituted to reflect the change of administration. Utah Ass'n of Counties v.
Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 n.1.
" Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 n.1.
94 Id. at 1176-77.
9 Executive Order 10355 delegated to the Secretary of the Interior"the authority
vested in the President by ... [the Pickett Act], and the authority otherwise
vested in him to withdraw or reserve lands of the public domain and other lands
owned or controlled by the United States . . . for public purposes ... " Exec.
Order No. 10,355, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831 (May 26, 1952).
" The Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (2000)), established a National Wilderness Preservation
System in order to "secure for the American people of present and future
generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness." 16 U.S.C. §
1131(a)(2000). Only Congress can designate public land as a wilderness area,
which is defined under that act, in part, as "an area where the earth and its
community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who
does not remain." Id. at § 113 1(c).
9' Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1176-77. The other laws
plaintiffs maintained were violated were the National Environmental Policy Act,
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, and the Anti-Deficiency Act. Id. at 1177.
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The court rejected all of these contentions and entered judgment
for the defendants.98
The court found that Congress had not violated the non-
delegation doctrine because the Act provided sufficient standards
to guide the President when exercising discretion in establishing
a monument.99 Accordingly, the President had not acted ultra vires
because the Property Clause repeatedly had been construed as
permitting Congress to delegate its authority under it. 100 As to the
contention that the President had violated the Act, the court noted
that the scope of judicial review was limited to whether he had
acted within his statutory authority.' In the case sub judice, it
was "evident from the language of the Proclamation that the
President exercised the discretion lawfully delegated to him by
Congress under the Antiquities Act, and that finding demarcate [d]
the outer limit of judicial review."' 2
Lastly, the court rejected the argument that Executive Order
10,355 could legally be interpreted to eliminate the President's
withdrawal authority because such a reading would be incon-
sistent with the express will of Congress. 10 3 As to the Wilderness
98 Id. at 1200-01.
99 Id. at 1190-91 ("The Antiquities Act sets forth clear standards and limitations.
The Act describes the types of objects that can be included in national
monuments and a limitation on the size of monuments.").
100 Id. at 1185-86. Plaintiffs additionally argued that because Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument included privately owned land, federal monies
had been expended to acquire such land in violation of the Spending Clause. Id.
The court rejected this contention reasoning that the proclamation provided for
the eventuality that private land could at some point in the future become part
of the monument, but as of then, no federal monies had been expended to acquire
such land. Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1185-86.
'o1 Id. at 1186 ("[A] lthough this Court is without jurisdiction to second-guess the
reasons underlying the President's designation of a particular monument, the
Court may still inquire into whether the President, when designating this
Monument, acted pursuant to the Antiquities Act.").
"02 Id. ("The language of the Proclamation clearly indicates that the President
considered the principles that Congress required him to consider: he used his
discretion in designating objects of scientific or historic value, and used his
discretion in setting aside the smallest area necessary to protect those objects.").
1o3 Id. In support of its ruling, the court reasoned:
The use of executive orders may be employed by the President
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Act, the court found that although a high percentage of the land
involved in the creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument could qualify as wilderness under that Act, the
President had designated a national monument and not
"wilderness."1 °4 Furthermore, any overlapping protection provided
to the lands by the Wilderness Act did not detract from the
President's authority to establish national monuments.'0 5
Another case involving a legal challenge to a monument
established under the Antiquities Act was Wyoming v. Franke.°6
There, the State of Wyoming disputed President Roosevelt's
Proclamation designating Jackson Hole National Monument on the
grounds that the area did not contain "objects of an historic or
scientific interest [as] required by the Act" and that the
proclamation was "not confined to the smallest area compatible
in carrying out his constitutional obligation to see that the laws
are faithfully executed and to delegate certain of his duties to
other executive branch officials, but an executive order cannot
impose legal requirements on the executive branch that are
inconsistent with the express will of Congress. Executive Order
10355 by its express terms does not eliminate the
President's authority, as granted specifically to the President by
Congress .... Whatever else may be said about the possible
reach of Executive Order 10355, it is undisputed that since its
passage in 1952 there have been 20 presidential proclamations
creating national monuments and none have transferred the
exercise of withdrawal authority to the Secretary of the Interior.
Id.
10 4 Id. at 1192. ("It is undisputed that the President's designation of the Grand
Staircase Monument was made pursuant to his authority under the Antiquities
Act. All of the land found within the boundaries of the Monument is part of the
Monument, regardless whether it could also qualify as wilderness.").
105 Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Bush, 316 F.3d at 1184-85. As to plaintiffs' claims
under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the Anti-Deficiency
Act, the court found that since none of those statutes provided private rights of
action, judicial review would only be available for "final agency action" under the
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). Id. at 1194. Because the President is
not considered an agency, however, actions taken by him are not subject to
judicial review under the APA. Id. at 1194-95.
106 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
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with the proper care and management of a National Monument."10 7
The district court rejected both of these arguments, finding that as
long as there was evidence "of a substantial character" presented
in conjunction with the President's determination that there were
objects of scientific or historic interest in the public lands at issue,
and also in defining the area compatible with the care and
management of said objects, any further judicial review with
respect to the President's exercise of discretion under the Act was
not permitted.0 8 The court further noted that given the nature of
the controversy, the "burden [wals on the Congress to pass such
remedial legislation as may obviate any injustice brought about as
the power and control over and disposition of government lands
inherently rests in its Legislative branch."10 9
The final two district court cases pertaining to the Antiquities
Act concerned President Carter's designation of national
monuments in Alaska. In Alaska v. Carter,"' the State of Alaska
sought injunctive relief in connection with the proposed
designation of national monuments, in part alleging violations of
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")."' The court
ruled that because the President was "not a federal agency," he
was not subject to NEPA's environmental impact statement req-
uirements." 2"The doctrine of separation of powers also counseled
against "inferring a Congressional intent to impose such a duty on
the President.""3 Lastly, because the recommendation made by the
1
07 Id. at 892.
108 Id. at 895-96. In dicta, the court noted that
if a monument were to be created on a bare stretch of
sage-brush prairie in regard to which there was no substantial
evidence that it contained objects of historic or scientific
interest, the action in attempting to establish it by proclamation
as a monument, would undoubtedly be arbitrary and capricious
and clearly outside the scope and purpose of the Monument Act.
Id. at 895.
0 9 Id. at 896.
110 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978).
.. Id. at 1156-59. See Quigley, supra note 11, at 82-84 for additional background
on this case.
112 Carter, 462 F. Supp. at 1159-60.
113 Id. at 1160. The court reasoned:
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Department of the Interior was furnished pursuant to the
President's request, 114 the Department did not have to file an
impact statement and, for a court to hold otherwise, "would raise
serious constitutional questions. " 11
In Anaconda Copper Company v. Andrus,"6 a copper company
and the State of Alaska challenged the designations of Admiralty
Island National Monument, the Gates of the Arctic National
Monument, and the Yukon Flats National Monument.117
Petitioners argued, in part, that the designations exceeded the
scope of the President's authority under the Act."' In granting
partial summary judgment for the United States on the
construction of the Act, the court reviewed the Act's legislative
history and concluded that the President's authority to establish
national monuments was not limited to historic and prehistoric
structures and historic landmarks alone." 9 The court noted that,
to the contrary, the President's authority was "much enlarged by
the extent of authority to declare by point of Proclamation public
monuments for other objects of historic or scientific interest."120
The court also found that executive and congressional practice
since the enactment of the Act supported this broader
interpretation of the grant of authority conferred to the
A familiar maxim of statutory construction is that "when one
interpretation of a statute would create a substantial doubt as
to the statute's constitutional validity, the courts will avoid that
interpretation absent a 'clear statement' of contrary legislative
intent." Applying the impact statement process to [the Secretary
of the Interior's] recommendations necessarily burden and
inhibit"the policy of open, frank discussion between subordinate
and chief concerning administrative action."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
114 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. ("[The President] may require the Opinion,
in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices...
115 Carter, 462 F. Supp at 1160.
16 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. Alaska 1980).
111 Id. at 1854.
118 Id. at 1853-54.1 9Id. at 1853-55.
120Id. at 1854-55.
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President.' 2 ' The court concluded that while the "outer
parameters" of presidential discretion under the Act had "not yet
been drawn by judicial decision," the proclamations at issue had
not exceeded the President's authority.
122
D. Synthesis of the Case Law
The cases demonstrate several points regarding the
President's power to designate national monuments under the
Antiquities Act. First, while judicial review is available, 123 courts
have limited their review to the question of whether the President
has facially exercised his discretion in accordance with the Act's
standards, and in doing so, have broadly interpreted the authority
of the President to designate national monuments under the Act.1
24
121 Id. at 1854. On the congressional side, the court found significant that, when
enacting FLMPA, "Congress did not curtail or restrict the exercise of presidential
authority." Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1854.
122 Id. at 1854-55; see also PAMELA BALDWIN, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO
CREATE A NATIONAL MONUMENT ON THE COASTAL PLAIN OF THE ARCTIC NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. No. RS20602, at n.4 (June 19, 2000)
[hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY] ("[Andrus] concluded that, although the
Act limited the authority of the President as to size and subject matter of
withdrawals, the outermost parameters of that authority had not yet been
articulated and the withdrawals before the court did not exceed the authority of
the President.").
121 See, e.g., Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1136. ("[Judicial] review is available
to ensure that the Proclamations are consistent with constitutional principles
and that the President has not exceeded his statutory authority."); Utah Ass'n
of Counties v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1186 ("Although judicial review is not
available to assess a particular exercise of presidential discretion, a Court may
ensure that a president was in fact exercising the authority conferred by the act
at issue."); Tulare County, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 25 ("court[s] can evaluate whether
President Clinton exercised his discretion in accordance with the standards of
the Antiquities Act, this court cannot review the President's determinations and
factual findings."); Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1853 ("[This
court] reject[s] the view that the only limitation upon the exercise ofpresidential
authority under Section 2 of the Antiquities Act... is the paramount power of
Congress in its undoubted authority to provide for the disposition and use of
public lands.").
124 See supra Part IV. See also Getches, supra note 19, at 306 ("[T]he Cameron
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Second, in considering a challenge, courts will focus on the Act's
two substantive components. With respect to what qualifies as
"historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures and other
objects of historic or scientific interest,"25 it is clear that the
President's authority is not limited solely to the designation of
archaeological sites.'26 Designation of public lands that contain
geological phenomena'2 7 or particular ecosystems will meet the
test.' 21 With respect to the second substantive requirement, that
decision seemed to license a liberal use of the Antiquities Act to withdraw large
blocks of public lands in the name of preserving 'objects of historic or scientific
interest.' Of course, it is difficult to imagine lands that would not feed some
historic or scientific interest."); Rasband, supra note 2, at 501-04 (discussing
broad judicial interpretation of the Act).
125 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
126 See Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1142 (recognizing that the President's
authority under the Act "is not limited to protecting only archaeological sites.");
Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1853 ("[Slomething more than
historical landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures might be encompassed
within a national monument."); cf. Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1137 (rejecting
the argument that only "rare and discrete man-made objects, such as prehistoric
ruins and ancient artifacts" may be designated as national monuments). See also
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY, supra note 122, at 2 ("Historically, although many
national monuments preserve historical sites, many have been made to protect
natural and biological phenomena as well. The authority to create national
monuments to protect areas of natural or biological interest has been upheld by
the Supreme Court on several occasions.").
127 See California, 436 U.S. at 34 (noting how Anacapa and Santa Barbara
Islands "contain[ed] fossils of Pleistocene elephants and ancient trees, and
furnish[ed] noteworthy examples of ancient volcanism, deposition, and active sea
erosion") (internal quotation omitted); Cameron, 252 U.S. at 456 (1920) (noting
how the Grand Canyon "affords an unexampled field for geologic study"); Franke,
58 F. Supp. at 895 (finding that Jackson Hole National Monument contained,
inter alia, "structures of glacial formation"). See also Getches, supra note 19, at
303 ("By the time of the Cameron decision, at least nine other large national
monuments had been set aside under the Act to preserve various geological
phenomena, not for protecting ruins as contemplated by Congress.") (footnote
omitted).
12 8 See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142 (finding that cyprinodom diabolis, also know
as Devil's Hole pupfish, was an object of scientific or historic interest); Franke,
58 F. Supp. at 895 (finding that Jackson Hole National Monument contained
"plant life indigenous to the particular area" and provided "a biological field for
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the designation of the national monument "be confined to the
smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of
the objects to be protected[,]"' 29 courts generally accord to the
President's factual determinations substantial judicial deference. 3 0
Finally, in addition to the government defending a presidential
national monument designation, challengers may also confront
third-party interveners such as environmental organizations.'
CONCLUSION
At different points in its history, the operation of the
Antiquities Act has raised concerns about procedural
fairness.'32 Some argue that the Act has been used "to deny the
research of wild life in its particular habitat ... involving a study of the origin,
life, habits and perpetuation of the different species of wild animals"); Anaconda
Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1854 ("Obviously, matters of scientific
interest ... which may involve plant, animal or fish life are within ... reach of
the presidential authority under the Antiquities Act."). See also Ranchod, supra
note 3, at 569 (noting how most of the national landscape national monuments
created by President Clinton "protect natural ecosystems") (footnote omitted).
129 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2003).
13 0 Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896; cf. Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1142 (noting that
"the Antiquities Act does not impose upon the President an obligation to make
any particular investigation" regarding the smallest area necessary for the
management and care of objects to be protected). See also Getches, supra note
19, at 308 ("So long as the historic or scientific nature of the area can be justified,
a decision to include a reasonable amount of surrounding territory would seem
to be within the scope of executive discretion that is shielded from judicial
disturbance."); PRESIDENTIALAUTHORITY, supra note 122, at 2 ("Although courts
today might prove to be less deferential to a President, it is still true that the
President has broad discretion under the 1906 Act and, although the issue is not
free from doubt, successfully challenging a monument based on its size appears
difficult.").
"' See, e.g., Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1248-49.
132 See Lin, supra note 2, at 719 (noting that "proceduralist objections stem from
a concern that the Act disregards democratic principles and usurps power from
state and local authorities"); Future of the Antiquities Act, supra note 21, at 620
(noting that presidential use of the Act regularly triggers "concern about
procedural fairness"); Leshy, supra note 26, at 305 ("Opponents of President
Clinton's uses of executive authority to conserve federal lands have focused not
nearly so much on what he ha[d] done as on how he ha[d] done it.").
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American people the right to have input in public lands
decisions."'33 Others counter that "it is arguably the very lack of
process that has allowed the Antiquities Act to serve the American
people so well over its long history."'34 This much, however, is
131 H.R. 1487, the National Monument NEPA Compliance Act: Hearing on H.R.
1487 Before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands of the House
Committee On Resources, 106th Cong. 9 (1999) (statement of Rep. Jim Hansen).
See Squillace, supra note 3, at 539 (noting that much of the criticism following
the designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
concerned the "Administration's failure to consult adequately with state officials,
and the statute's failure to establish a public process before a proclamation is
issued") (footnote omitted); Quigley, supra note 11, at 100-01 ("Today's federal
land management practices demand public participation, which the Antiquities
Act circumvents. Furthermore, there are numerous laws which are more efficient
and effective in carrying out the protection of federal lands while providing for
the development of natural resources.").
134 Squillace, supra note 3, at 476. See Getches, supra note 19, at 306 ("President
Carter's 1978 action setting aside millions of acres in Alaska as national
monuments was in response to Congress's failure to take action to protect
national interest lands in Alaska which, absent executive action, would have
opened them to disposal and development.") (footnotes omitted); Ranchod, supra
note 3, at 583-84 ("[C]ongressional decision-making usually favors local interests,
who may oppose restrictions on extractive use over national interests. In
contrast, the president is the only elected official chosen by a nationwide
constituency and who has the freedom and authority to act in the national
interest, considerably more quickly than Congress.") (footnote omitted); Press
Release, Office of Management and Budget, H.R. 1127 National Monument
Fairness Act of 1997 (Sept. 30, 1997), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/legislative/sap/105-1/HR1127-h.html) (lastviewed Sept. 21,2004) (opposing
H.R. 1127 and noting "that without the President's authority to act quickly,
many of America's grandest places would never have been protected and
preserved for future generations"). One commentator observes:
Antiquities Act withdrawals . ..may be the very kinds of
decisions that are more suitably made by the chief executive in
our representative democracy. The President serves a national
constituency, certainly more so than individual members of
Congress, and the federal lands are owned by the American
public as a whole. The President, being less subject to pressures
from local interests, is arguably better situated to make
decisions from a national perspective.
Lin, supra note 2, at 737 (footnotes omitted); Leshy, supra note 26, at 302 ("The
President-the only public official elected by all the people in the country-has
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clear: judicial review of a proclamation designating a national
monument under the Act is limited. 3 5 Congress, however, has
"many tools to ensure that executive abuses will not stand."136 For
example, Congress can amend or overturn the creation of a
national monument. 137 More broadly, Congress could seek to repeal
the Antiquities Act or amend it to restrict the President's exercise
of discretion thereunder, 13 but may need a supermajority to effect
more freedom to take a longer and broader view, to be more guided by a sense
of how the proposal would be regarded in the future by all the people in the
country.").
135 See Squillace, supra note 3, at 513-14 (noting that "it remains unlikely that
any court will overturn a presidential proclamation declaring a national
monument, absent compelling evidence that the area designated lacks objects of
historic or scientific interest.") (footnote omitted); Getches, supra note 19, at 306
("Short of a clear abuse of discretion, it appears that the courts will not be lured
into disputes that demand neat interpretations of the Act."); Nishimoto, supra
note 8, at 87 (noting that "'courts have interpreted broadly the President's
authority to declare national monuments under the Antiquities Act since its first
challenge in 1920 over President Theodore Roosevelt's designation of the Grand
Canyon."') (footnote omitted); Rasband, supra note 2, at 501 ("[The] conservation
track record of the Antiquities Act must ... be viewed in light of the fact that
there has never been a successful legal challenge to any presidential use of the
Act.").
136 Leshy, supra note 26, at 304.
137 See Squillace, supra note 3, at 550 ("The Congress of the United States has
the constitutional responsibility to make all needful rules governing the public
lands, and there is no doubt that Congress may use this authority to alter or
repeal monument designations created by the President."); Nishimoto, supra
note 8, at 94 ("Congress has the power to designate national monuments, change
monument boundaries, re-designate monuments as national parks, and abolish
monuments.") (footnote omitted); Lin, supra note 2, at 728 ("Congress may
express its disapproval of a monument designation by ... modifying or even
reversing a presidential designation to which it objects.") (footnote omitted);
Future of the Antiquities Act, supra note 21, at 629 ("[T]here is no question of
Congress' power to revoke or modify a national monument designation.")
138 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 10 at 3 (noting that Congress's options
"include repealing the Antiquities Act, amending the Act to restrict presidential
authority, overturning or amending the creation of a particular monument, and
enacting legislation to protect land through other designations"); Quigley, supra
note 11, at 84-85 (discussing bills introduced in connection with the designation
of Jackson Hole National Monument and seventeen monuments established by
President Carter to limit or repeal the Act); Johannsen, supra note 11, at 463
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such changes.'39 Another avenue available to Congress is found in
its power to appropriate funds. 14° In the end, "[congressional
correction remains the most potent check on excesses under the
Antiquities Act."'
4
'
(arguing that the Act "should be repealed, and Congress should reassert its
exclusive power to create national monuments") (footnotes omitted).
139 Ranchod, supra note 3, at 552. As explained by one commentator:
It is difficult for Congress to quickly change a monument
without presidential approval. Although a majority vote of
Congress is sufficient to pass legislation (and provide authority
to the president), it is generally insufficient to weaken protection
for a national monument because any president can be expected
to veto legislation weakening a monument he created. A two-
thirds vote of both houses of Congress is needed to override a
presidential veto. Therefore, Congress effectively needs a
supermajority vote to rein in any abuse of executive authority,
and to reverse or weaken a monument designation.
Id.; Lin, supra note 2, at 728-29 ("Admittedly, it may be difficult for Congress to
muster the two-thirds majority necessary to overcome a presidential veto.")
(footnote omitted).
140 Ranchod, supra note 3, at 553 ("Congress has blocked funding for specific
national monuments to express its displeasure with executive action on several
occasions."); Squillace, supra note 3, at 500 ("A President might be able to
preserve the status quo on public lands through a monument proclamation, but
he might be denied the money that was needed to protect the monument's
resources."); Fried, supra note 13, at 487 ("Following the designation of Jackson
Hole National Monument, Congress attached riders to every appropriation bill
for the Interior Department from 1944 to 1948, forbidding spending any federal
monies for management or upkeep of the monument.") (footnote omitted);
Nishimoto, supra note 8, at 94 ("Congress can.., influence the management of
monuments by attaching a rider to appropriations bills stating that no funds
may be spent to enforce the monument designations.").
141 Getches, supra note 19, at 306 (footnote omitted); see Franke, 58 F. Supp. at
896 ("[Ifi the Congress presumes to delegate its inherent authority to Executive
Departments which exercise acquisitive proclivities not actually intended, the
burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial legislation as may obviate any
injustice . . ").
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